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Abstract 
In 1986, the military establishment underwent the most sweeping package of 
defense reforms to be enacted in almost 40 years, starting with the Goldwater-Nichols 
Department of Defense Reorganization Act.  Related reforms followed shortly thereafter, 
including those contained in the National Defense Authorization Act of 1987, reflecting many 
of the recommendations of the Packard Commission. In the two decades following 





implement them.  However, some within the military services have grown increasingly 
concerned about the effect of some of these reforms, perceiving a growing divide between a 
military-run requirements process and a civilian-run acquisition process that they regard 
inimical to the efficient and effective support of military forces. 
This study describes analysis done, conclusions drawn and recommendations made 
to the Department of the Navy (DoN) regarding the closer integration of the interests of the 
Chief of Naval Operation (CNO), the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, 
Development and Acquisition (ASN (RD&A)), and the Navy acquisition community writ large 
to increase material capabilities and readiness at reduced costs. The effort was pursued 
through an assessment of the implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 in the 
Department of the Navy and related acquisition reforms. It also includes a comparison of the 
DoN with that of the Air Force and Army. 
Summary 
The House Armed Services Committee Panel on Defense Acquisition Reform: 
Findings & Recommendations, dated March 23, 2010, made the following recommendation 
in its review of DoD acquisition: The Department and Congress should review and clarify the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act’s separation between acquisition and the military service chiefs to 
allow detailed coordination and interaction between the requirements and acquisition 
processes and to encourage enhanced military service chief participation in contract quality 
assurance. 
The Panel is concerned that the divide established in the Goldwater-Nichols Act 
between acquisition and the military service chiefs has become so wide that it hinders both 
the acquisition and requirements process. While the fundamental construct in the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act correctly assigned lead responsibility for acquisition to the 
Department’s civilian leaders, the act should be clarified to ensure that the requirements 
process that must coordinate with all categories of the defense acquisition system freely 
interacts with the acquisition process.  The service chiefs should also be given greater 
authority and responsibility to oversee contract quality assurance especially for contracts 
that are highly operational in nature. 
The report addresses how the Department of the Navy approached and later 
instituted the Goldwater-Nichols Act in it Acquisition functions. The hallmark of that was to 
create and increase the divide between those who developed the Departments’ 
requirements and those who went on to procure them.  Starting with the change in the 
officer core that separated officers of the line with acquisition officer and ending with the 
Department’s “Gate" System, the Department has clearly developed parallel processes that 
are marked by division, discord and a lack of cooperation. The military side, building 
requirements, and the civilian side, buying the requirements rarely induced each other’s 
point of view in their internal processes.  As a result, requirements are sometimes 
overstated and unexecutable and the procurements process simply builds upon what is 
directed in the requirements process.  The acquisition boards and committees that make 
decisions are managed by the acquisition executives while the military requirements 
personnel attend at lower levels than flag rank. 
This paper discusses how the Department achieved that position over the years, 
addresses how the Army and Air Force instituted Goldwater-Nichols differently and makes 






The debate over the appropriate roles of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and of 
the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) in the material management process stretches back to 
the Civil War era.1 The essence of the debate is the role of uniformed leadership (i.e., the 
CNO) compared with that of the civilian leadership (i.e., the SECNAV) in determining what 
warfighting capabilities are required, what systems will be procured to provide these 
capabilities, how these systems will be supported when introduced into the fleet, and how 
these systems will be funded. In 1986, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense 
Reorganization Act (US Congress, 1986) weighed in on these roles as a key element in its 
overall reform of defense organization and processes, giving responsibility for defense 
acquisitions to civilian secretaries while strengthening joint uniformed oversight over the 
requirements process.  
In the two decades following enactment of this momentous legislation, the military 
services have taken numerous steps to implement its provisions and to respond to related 
acquisition reforms. However, some senior Navy officials have grown increasingly 
concerned about the unintended consequences of these reforms, perceiving a growing 
divide between a military-run requirements process and a civilian-run acquisition process.  
Objectives and Approaches 
RAND examined (1) the policy issues that drove the passage of the Goldwater-
Nichols Act and related acquisition reforms and (2) the Department of the Navy’s (DoN) 
implementation of these reforms, particularly with regard to their influence on military and 
civilian roles in the Navy’s acquisition process.  It describes the context in which the 
acquisition reform occurred and the effects of that reform on acquisition processes, focusing 
largely on the Department of the Navy. Drawing on a series of interviews with several 
officials who were present when the legislation was implemented, it argues that the effect 
was to focus the attention of the Chief of Naval Operations on requirements issues and to 
divorce him from the acquisition process in a way that has been detrimental to the effective 
and efficient acquisition of materiel for the Department of the Navy. It further argues that this 
separation went beyond what the legislation required and that there needs to be closer 
integration of the interests of the Chief of Naval Operation (CNO) with the Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition (ASN (RD&A)) and the 
Navy acquisition community to increase material capabilities and readiness at reduced 
costs.  
The authors note that this paper deals with more than the Goldwater-Nichols 
legislation and considers several other influences such as the troubled history of the armed 
forces in coordinating joint operations and influential commissions such as the Packard 
Commission. These other influences all coalesced in the mid-1980s and created an 
environment—a perfect storm—that both made the passage of Goldwater-Nichols possible 
and colored its implementation. In essence, the Goldwater-Nichols legislation stands as a 
proxy for these other influences. 
To understand the policy issues behind the Goldwater-Nichols Act and related 
acquisition reforms, RAND reviewed literature on the political and economic environment 
                                                





leading up to these initiatives as well as analyses of Defense acquisition problems.2 To 
understand how the DoN implemented acquisition reforms and the effect of this 
implementation, Navy implementation guidance was reviewed (such as SECNAV Instruction 
5400.15C) as well as DoD guidance (DoD 5000.2), and both former and current DoN 
officials were interviewed, including officials outside of the DoN deeply involved in 
implementing Goldwater-Nichols and related reforms, including the following individuals: two 
Secretaries of the Navy, an Assistant Secretary of the Navy/Research, Development and 
Acquisition (ASN (RD&A)), Chief of Naval Operations, a Deputy Chief of Naval 
Operations/Logistics, a Navy General Counsel and Deputy General Counsel, a Vice 
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, two Undersecretaries for Defense/Acquisition, Technology 
and Logistics (USD (AT&L)), Systems Commanders (NAVAIR and NAVSEA), Program 
Executive Officers (Ships, Tactical Air, and Submarines), and Program Managers.  
RAND also interviewed former US Army and US Air Force senior uniformed and 
civilian officials to compare their implementation of Goldwater-Nichols in those services and 
the effect of other reform influences with that of the DoN’s. A synthesis of their views are 
captured and presented. 
There is an inherent limitation in this approach: in terms of sheer numbers, as not 
very many people were interviewed, and those interviewed provided their recollections of 
events that happened more than 20 years ago. That said, those that were interviewed were 
key players during the implementation and are reporting first-hand experiences. Also, 
because they were interviewed them separately, the authors were able to crosscheck one 
account with another. Furthermore, much of our discussion with them revolved around the 
effect of that implementation, and those interviewed are uniquely qualified to analyze the 
effect of the legislation on the processes and the implications of the divide between the 
requirements and the acquisition processes. 
The Context of Goldwater-Nichols 
The passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act culminated in 1986—the result of 
operational, organizational and fiscal pressures that had been building for a number of years 
and, indeed, continued after the act was passed. These pre- and post-enactment events are 
important because they provide the context in which legislation was passed and 
implemented in the Department of Defense and the military services. This chapter briefly 
describes these forces and their significance in the crafting, passage, and implementation of 
the legislation. 
Timeline 
Figure 1 portrays the timeline of events that occurred before, during, and after the 
passage of Goldwater-Nichols. The timeline underscores several points. First, the forces 
that eventually called Goldwater-Nichols into being began decades before the act was 
passed. Second, these forces manifested themselves in quite different venues: operational 
performance of US military forces, the performance of the system that governed the 
                                                
2 Analyses included the Defense Management Review (1989), the Packard Commission report 
(1986), the Joint Defense Capability Study (2004), the Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment 
Report (2006), and assessments conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies and 





acquisition of military weapons and weapons systems, and the behavior and practices of 
those who operated in that system. Third, a remarkable number of important events 
occurred in a five-year period, 1985-1990, that built an almost unstoppable momentum to 
ensure that long-standing issues would finally be dealt with in a systematic way. In this case, 
the effect of the whole far exceeded that of the parts. The sections below briefly describe the 





























Figure 1. Events Contributing to the Context of Goldwater Nichols 
The Context in Summary 
The operational problems of the US military impelled Congress to change how the 
services selected personnel for assignment to joint duty and to change the entire military 
command structure. Poor acquisition outcomes and instances of fraud hardened 
congressional resolve to take steps in that arena as well. No single event necessarily led to 
the creation and passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. However, the combination of them, 
especially the ones that occurred in close succession in the latter half of the 1980s, 
contributed to the construction and passage of various legislation, the internal approaches 
regulation and to implementing that legislation and, subsequently, to the continuing resolve 
to ensure continual implementation of these various legislative provisions and regulations 
even in the face of emerging, unforeseen consequences. The next chapter describes how 
military acquisition was done before and after Goldwater-Nichols to provide a way to assess 
the nature of scope of the changes that legislation directed. 
                                                
3 The phrase "perfect storm" is used to describe an event in which a rare combination of 
circumstances exacerbates a situation drastically. It was also the title of a 1997 book and a 2000 





The Goldwater-Nichols Act and the National Defense 
Authorization Act of 1987 
This chapter briefly describes the main players in the enactment of Goldwater-
Nichols and the key provisions of the act.  It also discusses the National Defense 
Authorization Act of 1987. 
Key Players 
In 1985, Senators Barry Goldwater and Samuel Nunn brought many of the issues 
described in Chapter 2 to the attention of the Congress in a series of energetic floor 
speeches designed to garner political support for reform. An interesting and important 
perspective on staff roles was articulated in views expressed by Senator Goldwater. Nunn 
and Goldwater were joined in their efforts by Representative William F. Nichols in the House 
of Representatives. In Senate floor speeches, Senator Goldwater addressed what he 
perceived as the misguided financial focus of the military: “Our professional officer corps 
frequently behaves more like business managers than warriors.”  He also expounded on the 
issue of the civilian control in the military establishment: “[A] major problem created by the 
functional structure of OSD is that it encourages micromanagement of Service programs . . . 
it has the tendency to get over-involved in details that could be better managed by the 
Services.”  Two major points reflective of earlier reports on military operations were the 
following: 
 First, there was the lack of true unity of command, and second, there was 
inadequate cooperation among US military services when called upon to perform 
joint operations (Anno & Einspahr, 1988).  
 The preferred advice [from the Joint staff] is generally irrelevant, normally unread 
and almost always disregarded (US Congress, 1986). 
Senator Nunn expanded on the issue of structural alignment: “The Office of the 
Secretary of Defense is focused exclusively on functional areas, such as manpower, 
research and development, and installations and logistics. This functional structure serves to 
inhibit integration of Service capabilities along mission lines, and thereby, hinders achieving 
DoD’s principal organization goal of mission integration” (“Defense Organization,” 1985).  
Key Provisions of Goldwater-Nichols 
The two Senators led the effort to draft the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which was signed 
into law in 1986; it made major changes in four broad areas: the chain of command and 
provision of military advice to the civilian leadership, the interaction of the military services, 
the personnel management of officers, and the acquisition of military equipment. The bill 
passed with wide bipartisan support, passing the House of Representatives, 383-27, and the 
Senate, 95-0. It was signed into law by President Reagan on October 1, 1986 (Goldwater-
Nichols Act, 2010).  
Each of the several key aspects of the Goldwater-Nichols Act addressed below had 
important ramifications for the DoD writ large, but their implementation in the DoN had 
consequences not fully understood at the time and as are more fully discussed in Chapter 5, 






The Chain of Command and Provision of Military Advice to the Civilian 
Leadership 
In a key provision, military advice to civilian authority was streamlined and 
centralized in the person of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), who became 
the principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Council and the 
Secretary of Defense. Previously, the chiefs of the individual services performed many of 
these roles. The CNO, for example, was the advisor to the President for naval matters. 
Further, the act established the position of Vice Chairman of the JCS, and increased the 
ability of the Chairman to direct overall strategy, while providing greater command authority 
to "unified" and "specified" field commanders.4  
Interaction of the Military Services  
The act also effected a sea change in service interactions by diminishing the role of 
the service chiefs and restricting the military services’ operational control over forces, 
emphasizing their responsibility to support the Military Department secretaries in their Title 
10 vote to "organize, train and equip" military forces for use by the combatant commanders. 
The services became “force providers” to the unified commanders (called the CINCs for 
Commanders in Chief). Their mission was to provide suitably trained and equipped forces to 
the CINC, which he requested through the Joint Staff. The CINC could be from any service, 
but he had authority to request assets from any service through the joint system (Nardulli, 
Perry, Pirnie, Gordon, & McGinn, 2002).5  
These first two unraveled relationships, at least within the DoN, had developed and 
evolved for over 50 years. That is not to say that change is impermissible, but in this case, 
there was no clear sense of the nature of the new role to be played by the Service Chief; it 
was rather a product of what he wasn’t to do. 
The latter two went to the heart of the opportunity for operational personnel (officers 
of the line) to participate in acquisition matters and frankly, even if they desired to play a 
role. In Chapter 5, RAND will address the cultural manifestations of these changes. 
Personnel Management of Officers 
Another significant but more subtle change was the direction that an officer could not 
receive promotion to flag rank without having had a joint duty assignment.6  Underlying this 
requirement was the perception on the part of lawmakers that the services were reluctant to 
send their best officers to joint duty assignments, preferring to keep them in their own ranks. 
Indeed, a joint duty assignment was perceived by many as a backwater and an indication 
that an individual’s military career was not progressing well. Officers resisted going to such 
                                                
4 Unified commanders had geographical responsibilities, e.g., the Pacific area. Specified commanders 
had functional responsibilities, e.g., Strategic Air Command. 
5 CINC (now COCOM) requests go to the Joint Staff, which then coordinates the delivery of requested 
assets with the relevant service. Requests are not automatically approved, as the case of 
CINCEUCOM’s request for Apache helicopters during the military operations in Kosovo during the 
effort to topple Serbia’s Milosovic illustrate. All four services did not concur with the request, which 
was ultimately approved by the Secretary of Defense.  
6 Flag rank refers to generals in the Army, Air Force or Marine Corps or admirals in the Navy, so 
called because those achieving that rank are authorized a flag with the number of stars on it denoting 





assignments and, if assigned to a joint billet, tried to leave them as soon as they could. 
Stipulating that promotion to flag rank could not occur without a joint duty assignment 
ensured that the services would be willing to assign their best officers to such billets. 
Acquisition of Military Equipment 
The Goldwater-Nichols Act also specifically addressed acquisition issues, giving sole 
responsibility for acquisition (as part of the assignment of several “functional” areas of 
responsibility) to the Secretary of each military department. For example, as it pertained to 
the DoN, Section 1045 stated: 
(C) (1) The Office of the Secretary of the Navy shall have sole responsibility within 
the Office of the Secretary of the Navy, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 
and the Headquarters, Marine Corps, for the following functions: (A) Acquisition; (B) 
Auditing; (C) Comptroller (including financial management); (D) Information 
management; (E) Inspector General; (F) Legislative affairs; (G) Public affairs. (US 
Congress, 1986, 100 Stat. 1045) 
As noted in this chapter, many of these functional responsibilities were already being 
performed by elements of the DoN Secretariat, unlike the situation in the other military 
departments. The word “sole” was to contribute to some interpretation of what was meant by 
the change. The act further stipulated that the Secretary designate a single organization 
within the Secretary’s office—that is, a Service Acquisition Executive (SAE)— to manage the 
function of acquisition.  
It is noteworthy that even after the legislative changes had been passed, Senator 
Nunn continued to debate the balance of service and civilian command and control. 
Relevant to the goal of this project in investigating the role of the Chief of Naval Operations 
is Senator Nunn’s concern over barriers between the Military Department Secretary and 
Service Chief:   
Another area that was of concern is in the consolidation of the military and civilian 
staffs in the military departments. The conference agreed to consolidate several 
functions, such as acquisition, comptroller, inspector general, and legislative liaison, 
under the Secretaries of the military departments and directed that the service chiefs 
not set up competing bureaucracies within their staffs. In the conference, I was 
concerned that we not create an impenetrable wall between the staffs of the Service 
Secretary and the Service Chief. (“Defense Organization,” 1985)  
National Defense Authorization Act of 1987 
The National Defense Authorization Act of 1987 (US Congress, 1987) attempted to 
fill several policy concerns not addressed by the Goldwater-Nichols Act. For example, it 
addressed the problem of the excessive number of briefings program managers were 
required to give to get program approval, decreasing them to two: one to the Program 
Executive Officer and one to either of the DoD or Service Acquisition Executive (depending 
upon the acquisition approval threshold of the program). It also addressed the need for a 
streamlined reporting chain from PMs to PEOs to the Senior Acquisition Executive. These 
and other provisions both in this act and in legislation enacted in succeeding years—the 
latest being the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA)—give people proof that 





address the crisis of the day. This approach has consequences as will be addressed in later 
chapters. 
Acquisition Before and After Goldwater-Nichols 
The primary focus of this paper falls on the Navy. However,  changes that occurred 
in the Army and Air Force are evaluated as well because, in some instances, they 
responded to the legislation in ways that differed from the Navy (for purposes discussion of 
the Marine Corps, it falls under the DoN regulations applicable for the Navy), and those 
differences are illuminating.  We first briefly viewed of the processes at the DoD level, and 
then follow with discussions about the Navy, Army and Air Force. In each of the latter cases, 
the discussion is guided by the change in service acquisition regulations, which is 
summarized in tabular form for each service.  
OSD 
Before the implementation of late 1980s acquisition reforms and the subsequent 
streamlining that resulted, each military department had an acquisition organization that 
included more stakeholders and more steps in the process. The DoD individual with 
responsibility for most functions that currently reside with the Undersecretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD (AT&L)) was the Undersecretary of Defense for 
Research and Engineering. Before 1986, the Secretary of Defense had overall responsibility 
for DoD Acquisitions. The Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense 
presided over milestone decisions (DoDD 5000.1, 1986) similar to those that the current 
“Defense Acquisition Executive” or DAE is responsible for. Following the Goldwater-Nichols 
reforms, the most significant changes for the DoD-level acquisition were that many of the 
Secretary of Defense’s acquisition decision authorities were delegated to the USD for 
Acquisitions (USD(A)) and the Director of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization 
now reported to the office of USD(A).  Specifically, the USD(A) was designated as the 
Defense Acquisition Executive. This position is “the principal advisor to the Secretary of 
Defense on all matters pertaining to the Department of Defense Acquisition System” (DoDD 
5000.1, 1987). Before the Deputy Secretary and various under secretaries (Research and 
Engineering, Policy), assistant secretaries (Acquisition and Logistics, Force Management 
and Personnel, Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence, and Comptroller), 
and the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation were responsible for different aspects of 
the acquisition process. In response to the 1987 Defense Authorization Act, DoDD 5000.1 
(1987) also restricted the number of “management tiers” between the program manager 
(PM) and the DAE. These management tiers were designated as the Program Executive 
Officer (PEO) and the Service Acquisition Executive (SAE).  
The Navy 
Navy History and Culture 
Each service has its own history and culture, and these profoundly influence how the 
services operate. In the case of the Navy, one of the signal differences appears in the titles 
of the chiefs of service. Both the Army and the Air Force are headed by an individual 
designated as the Chief of Staff, which implies an individual who oversees the workings of a 
staff and is himself a staff officer. The head of the Navy, however, is designated the Chief of 
Naval Operations, which implies an individual with operational command, and, indeed, this 





service chiefs, only the CNO held a position in which he was both heavily involved in service 
operational matters, from the time he was designated as the “Aide for Operations,” and also 
ultimately served as the principal advisor to the President on such matters. The point is that 
the CNO historically focused on operational matters. 
Up until 1966, the Navy was often informally referred to as “bi-linear,” reflecting the 
fact that the CNO focused on the operational issues of the Navy with the Secretary of the 
Navy wholly responsible for the materiel component, including research and acquisition 
elements. The tension between the military and civilian leadership of the Department of the 
Navy over materiel matters was longstanding, and historically CNOs had pushed for a 
greater role in acquisition matters, to include lobbying the President.7  Organizationally, the 
chiefs of the Navy’s materiel bureaus reported to the Secretary of the Navy for all materiel 
matters. In 1966, the Secretary established the Navy Materiel Command (NMC), which was 
commanded by a senior admiral with extensive operational experience and who reported 
also to the CNO. This was a major change (one of the tectonic shifts alluded to above), 
because it placed the CNO directly in the line of materiel—including acquisition—issues. 
What was bi-linear had become uni-linear in that now both the CNO and the Secretary of the 
Navy had direct roles in the oversight of those organizations pursuing acquisition matters.8 
Before the Storm 
Acquisition before the passage of Goldwater-Nichols was governed by SECNAV 
Instruction 4200.29A, dated May 24, 1985, and entitled Procurement Executives. The 
wording in that instruction made the Secretary of the Navy the de facto “acquisition 
executive” referred to in subsequent legislation and regulation. It recognized his decision 
authority for acquisition matters pertaining to the Navy. The instruction designated the 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Shipbuilding and Logistics (ASN (S&L)) as the senior 
procurement executive and held him responsible for the performance of systems and for 
managing the career acquisition workforce. He was designated as the focal point for 
procurement and the logistical systems necessary to support the systems the Navy 
procured. 
The instruction directed the CNO to support the ASN (S&L) in carrying out his duties. 
During this period, the three major warfare branches of the Navy—air, surface, and 
submarine—were each represented by a three-star admiral on the OPNAV staff who had 
direct contact with the systems commanders for material in their warfare area. Each had 
program officers who maintained liaison with the program managers reporting to the system 
commanders.  
                                                
7 In a memorandum to the Secretary of the Navy dated March 2, 1934, President Franklin Roosevelt, 
himself a former Assistant Secretary of the Navy, said: 
In my judgment he [the President] would too greatly delegate this power [control of Naval 
Administration] if he delegated to the Chief of Naval Operations the duty of issuing direct 
orders to the bureaus and offices. . . . By this, I mean that the Chief of Naval Operations 
should coordinate to [sic] all repairs and alterations to vessels, etc., by retaining constant and 
frequent touch with the heads of bureaus and offices. But at the same time, the orders to 
Bureaus and offices should come from the Secretary of the Navy. 
8 The CNO always had influence in this area by virtue of his control over promotions and 





The CNO played directly in the procurement process in multiple ways. His most 
direct role was reviewing all programs going to the Secretary of the Navy for decision. The 
mechanism for this review was the CNO’s Executive Board (CEB, pronounced “KEB”), on 
which the Vice Chief Naval Office also sat. But, as is discussed below, the system 
commanders also reported to him through the CEB, giving the CNO another opportunity to 
engage in materiel management.  
While the Systems Commanders reported directly to the four-star commander of the 
NMC, they also had reporting responsibilities to the CNO and two ASNs (S&L and RE&S) in 
their areas of responsibility, while coordinating matters through the NMC. The three warfare 
branch vice admirals on the CNO’s staff identified above did the planning and programming 
for their individual warfare area systems and coordinated with the NMC and the Systems 
Commands. Programming reviews were carried out through a CNO chartered board. The 
program managers reported to the Systems Commanders through their functional flag 







































Figure 2. Navy Acquisition before Goldwater-Nichols  
Although not codified in Navy instructions until later, in 1985, the Secretary of the 
Navy abolished the NMC, which was another of the tectonic shifts that occurred in Navy 
acquisition. The Chief of the Naval Material Command was a four-star officer of the line who 
brought senior level credibility to the materiel establishment and buffered the materiel 
community when needed. The disestablishment of the NMC eliminated this buffer and 
started the erosion of the operational credentials of the materiel community that occurred 
over time and the bona fides of decisions proposed by them. It has been argued that this 
very ability to argue for differing perspectives was also the proximate cause for the 
disestablishment of the NMC as was the fact that the NMC comprised another management 
layer, slowed the decision process, and ran counter to the views expressed by the Packard 
Commission on lines of authority. 





The DoN implemented Goldwater-Nichols in two steps. First, it designated the 
Secretary of the Navy as Acquisition Executive. Second, it attempted to use as many of the 
existing processes as possible to accomplish the act’s intent. Both steps drew fire from the 
Comptroller General (Conahan, 1989). The DoN’s implementing instruction did incorporate 
language from the Goldwater-Nichols Act regarding establishment of a single organization 
within the SECNAV’s office to assume authority over the acquisition system. In doing so, the 
instruction stated that the CNO and Commandant of the Marine Corps “will execute their 
responsibilities through the resource allocation process and their input to the acquisition 
decision-making process.”     
Implementing the Goldwater-Nichols Act imposed important changes on the Navy’s 
acquisition process. In the view of a former Secretary of the Navy, the law simply allowed 
too much latitude in implementation. For example, a former General Counsel for the Navy 
and a former ASN RDA interpreted the provision that assigned authority for the acquisition 
process to the service secretaries as entirely excluding the service chiefs from the 
acquisition process. However, the first CNO to operate under the new provision said that he 
had been unclear about his role in the acquisition process. He added that he had been 
advised not to get involved in acquisition decision-making, but felt that he had to, and had 
ignored the advice because he was being held “accountable” by the Congress for 
acquisition failures, such as the A-12 aircraft program.9   
Different interpretations are also reflected in the different forms that implementation 
took among the Navy, Army, and Air Force. Each of the military departments implemented 
the law differently and all came under fire from the Comptroller General for various reasons. 
The common theme of these attacks was that each service had PEOs (Program Executive 
Officers) reporting to the applicable military Systems Command structure. Following the 
GAO report, each severed the PEO structure from the Systems Commands.10 
Following the passage of Goldwater-Nichols, the Navy issued a new instruction, 
5430.96, dated August 4, 1987 (and a companion instruction dated August 5, 1987). The 
instruction designated the Secretary of the Navy as acquisition executive for the Navy. Thus, 
he held not only program decision authority, but, as Acquisition Executive, he was also 
responsible for the acquisition process. In support of the Secretary in that role, the ASN 
(S&L) reported directly to him for acquisition matters. The ASN (S&L) was charged with 
responsibility for supplying, equipping, servicing, maintaining the Navy’s equipment. He had 
responsibility for acquisition production and support for the Navy and the Marine Corps and 
to “provide such staff support as the CNO and [the Commandant] each consider necessary.” 
The second instruction, 5430.95 and dated one day after 5430.96, pertained to the ASN 
(R,E&S). He was responsible for all DoN acquisition except shipbuilding and conversion. He 
also had responsibility for matters related to research and development. In this role, the 
Chief of Naval Research reported to him. These instructions also codified the elimination of 
the Naval Materiel Command. 
                                                
9 The CNO had to deal with the consequences of the unraveling of the A-12 program. In our interview 
with him, he expressed the view that Congress was demanding answers from him on a range of 
issues with regard to the A-12 replacement program, the F-18 E/F and that given what had occurred 
in the A-12, he had to be aware and involved in aspects of program decision-making, both to 
represent Navy interests and concerns before Congress and to be able to defend Navy resources. 
10 The Army and the Air Force later gained permission from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to 





The most significant change occurred in the role of the CNO. The new instruction 
divested him of acquisition responsibilities. Rather, 5430.96 charged him with supplying, 
servicing, maintaining, outfitting and logistic functions. And 5430.95 directed him to 
formalize and prioritize requirements, conduct test and evaluation, prioritize research, 
development, test and evaluation, and directed him to provide advice and support to the 
Secretary. Thus, he became responsible for determining what equipment the Navy needed 
but not acquiring it. That function was now located wholly in the Secretariat.  
Under the provisions of 5430.96, the Systems Commanders now reported to the 
DoN Acquisition Executive for all PEO matters under the direction of the ASN (S&L). 
Similarly, the PEOs also reported to the ASN (S&L).  
Figure 3 depicts these changes. The bar and circle symbol indicates eliminations, in 
this case the Naval Materiel Command and the dotted line between the systems command 
and the CEB, which still existed but had lost any approval authority. Note also that the PEOs 
no longer report to the System Commanders. They now report directly to the AE, the 









































Figure 3. Navy Acquisition in 1987 
Passage of Goldwater-Nichols did not lay to rest all acquisition issues nor were all 
applicable organizational and process changes implemented immediately. As indicated 
above, John Lehman, who was Secretary of the Navy from 1981 to 1987, designated 
himself as the Acquisition Executive. In the view of the Secretary of Defense, that did not 
accord with the intent of the legislation, and the Secretary and his Deputy pressed the DoN 
to designate an individual Assistant Secretary as the Acquisition Executive, eventually 
directing the DoN to make that change. An August 1991 instruction (5400.15), codified the 
Secretary of Defense’s direction, providing that the Assistant Secretary of the Navy 
(Research, Development and Acquisition) (ASN RD&A) had the full-time role in development 
and procurement of systems, ensuring that operational requirements were transformed into 






The 1991 instruction underscored the CNO’s role in determining requirements and 
establishing a relative priority among them. It also indicated that he might be assigned 
responsibility for research and development matters and for operational test and evaluation, 
but it was clear that he could not assign himself a role in those areas. This instruction also 
codified the elimination of the “warfare branch admirals,” and their relationships with the 
material establishment of the Department. 
The instruction charged the systems commanders with the management of programs 
other than those assigned to a PEO and directed them to provide support services to the 
PEOs. For their part, the PEOs were directed to report to the ASN (RD&A), and the 
instruction directed program managers to report to the PEOs. The reporting line from the 
PEOs now runs directly to the newly named ASN (RD&A) rather than to the Secretary of the 
Navy. The Secretary retains his approval powers, but not the direct management of the 
process, for those decisions he is empowered to make.11  Figure 4 shows this continuing 
evolution of the Navy acquisition procedures. Key changes shown in the figure include both 
the changes shown in Figure 3 (elimination of Navy Materiel Command, the reduced role of 
the CEB, and the formal designation of the Secretary of the Navy as the AE) as well as 
some additional ones. A key one is that the AE is now the ASN (RD&A), and the PEOs 
report to him rather than to the Secretary. The position of the ASN (S&L) has been 
eliminated, as have the warfare branch admirals on the CNO’s staff (again, shown by the 
bar and circle symbol). The chain of acquisition approval flows directly to the ASA (RD&A) 












































Figure 4. Subsequent Changes to Navy Acquisition Procedures 
                                                
11 Decisions about programs that cross certain thresholds in terms of dollars for research and 
development and procurement must be made at the Department of Defense level. These are referred 
to as ACAT 1 decisions. 
12 For a relatively few years, the Undersecretary of the Navy was designated as the AE, but the duties 





Three instructions were published subsequent to 5400.15 in 1991: 5400.15A in 
1995, 5400.15B in 2005, and 5400.15C in 2007. None changed the major responsibilities of 
the Secretary, the CNO or the Acquisition Executive, although they elaborated on some of 
the functions. For example, 5400.15B designated the CNO as the principal advisor to the 
Secretary in the allocation of resources to meet programming and budget processes. In 
essence, the instruction conferred on the CNO the responsibility to advise the Secretary on 
what programmatic priorities to assign to the requirements, the development of which was 
his primary responsibility. He still stood outside the procurement process. Instruction 
5400.15C charged the CNO to analyze alternatives in conjunction with the ASN (RD&A) 
before the development phase of a weapon system. 
Instructions after 1991 also elaborated on the responsibility of the Systems 
Commanders and the PEOs. For example, 5400.15A stipulated that the Systems 
Commanders would exercise the authority of the Acquisition Executive to supervise 
acquisition programs directly and, notably, reporting to the CNO for execution of programs 
that were not development or acquisition projects. Thus, the wall between the CNO and the 
procurement process remained intact. PEOs were authorized to act for and exercise the 
authority of the Acquisition Executive with respect to their assigned programs and maintain 
oversight of the cost and schedule performance.  
Summary of Key Changes in Navy Acquisition 
The process of acquiring Navy equipment changed dramatically between 1966 and 
1991. Some changes were more gradual than others. The creation of the “uni-linear” Navy 
took decades, and crystallized with the establishment of Navy Materiel Command in 1966. 
Its subsequent dissolution in 1985 marked an equally significant shift. However, most key 
changes occurred as part of the perfect storm of events that centered on the Goldwater-
Nichols legislation. While the effects of that legislation rippled beyond the procurement 
process and within the process itself, the most critical ones were the roles defined for the 
Secretary of the Navy, the Assistant Secretaries, and the CNO. The effect on the CNO was, 
arguably, the greatest, since the result was his defined exclusion from the procurement 
process. The Secretary retained his approval power but was forced to delegate 
responsibility for the process to one of his Assistant Secretaries and subordinate elements 
of the Systems Commands. The ASN (RD&A) assumed responsibilities previously carried 
out by the Secretary, even though, as one of the Secretaries of the Navy interviewed 
opined, only the Secretary had the responsibility and gravitas in all elements of the decision 
process (requirements, resources and politics) to be able to perform the job well. The 
creation of the PEOs elevated their importance and visibility in the process while eliminating 
much technical senior oversight. 
The Army 
Before the Storm 
The Secretary of the Army is responsible for all activities occurring within the 
department, including acquisition. Indeed, Army acquisition policy (AR 70-1) was either 
signed directly by the Secretary of the Army or “by order” of the Secretary. Before 
implementation of Goldwater-Nichols and the 1987 Defense Authorization Act provisions, 
the Secretary was supported by an assistant secretary who was almost always designated 
as the Army Acquisition Executive (AAE). In 1984 before the acts, the role of the AAE had 
been assigned to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development, and 





chaired the Army Systems Acquisition Review Council (ASARC), and decided whether 
acquisition programs were ready to progress past key milestones. It appears, however, that 
the ASA (RD&A) did not directly supervise acquisition programs or personnel, as is currently 
the case. That duty resided with a uniformed officer on the Army staff, the Deputy Chief of 
Staff for Research, Development and Acquisition (DSCRDA). Program reviews, officer 
assignments and program management assignments all emanated from the DSCRDA. This 
three-star general had the staff to manage the acquisition process and worked with the ASA 
(RD&A), who had a very small staff. 
The executing authority for acquisition programs resided with the Development and 
Readiness Command (DARCOM). The Army materiel commands, similar to the Navy 
systems commands, worked for the DARCOM (DARCOM’s successor is the Army Materiel 
Command or AMC). DARCOM’s Commanding General reported to the Chief of Staff of the 
Army (CSA) and the Secretary of the Army. Figure 5 depicts these relationships. Thus, even 
though the Secretary of the Army was the acquisition decision-maker and he had an 
assistant secretary who oversaw the acquisition system, by practice, the Chief of Staff of the 
Army, through DCSRDA and DARCOM, had the greatest influence over acquisition 
decisions. The Army’s ASARC was the body that performed the highest level review function 
before a Secretary of Army decision (or recommendation in the case of a decision on a 
given program being made by the Secretary of Defense). The ASA (RD&A) and the Vice 
Chief of Staff of the Army co-chaired this council. 
 
Figure 5. Army Acquisition before Goldwater-Nichols 
After the Storm 
Following the Goldwater-Nichols era reforms, the Army reissued its acquisition 
regulations four times (in 1988, 1993, 1997, and 2003). In 1988, the DCSRDA position was 
eliminated and the ASA (RD&A) was designated as the “Deputy Army Acquisition Executive 
and provided ‘principal secretariat support’ to the Acquisition Executive” (the Secretary of 
the Army). The regulations issued in 1993 implemented the first round of structural changes 
that are most representative of the changes that have endured to the present day. Because 
the Goldwater-Nichols Act required streamlined acquisition chains of command and limited 
“outside” influence over acquisition activities, the acquisition chains of command were 
shortened to three levels for service-managed acquisitions. As mentioned earlier, the 





This revision to Army Regulations saw the delegation of AAE responsibilities to the Assistant 
Secretary level. The AAE role was initially assigned to the ASA (RD&A), and later the name 
was changed to the ASA (AL&T) (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology). Following the 
reforms, the AAE was more centrally positioned in the Army’s acquisition process. One key 
aspect of that involved managing and supervising PEOs and PMs, a function that before 
Goldwater-Nichols had been performed by the DCSRDA. 
Also, as was the case with the Navy, the service chief and the deputy chiefs of staff 
were no longer directly engaged in the acquisition process. They retained their 
responsibilities to produce requirements for the acquisition of new materiel and to develop 
the Program Objectives Memorandum (POM), which allocated funding to the priorities set by 
the President, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Army. But with regard to core 
acquisition management functions, their tasking was only to state requirements and support 
the PEOs and PMs. The one exception to this was the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army who, 
continued to co-chair the ASARC with the ASA (RD&A). In this role, the Vice Chief was able 
to represent the operational Army throughout the materiel acquisition process. Other 
commands and individuals such as the DCSOPS and TRADOC, now, the Army Materiel 
Command, which had replaced the DARCOM continued to report to the Army Chief of Staff. 
However, the principal acquisition functions that they once managed were reorganized into 
a different chain of command. Figure 6 depicts these changes. 
 
Figure 6. Army Acquisition in 1993 
Summary of Key Changes in Army Acquisition 
As with the Navy, the primary effects of the Goldwater-Nichols era reforms were to 
remove the Chief of Staff of the Army and his supporting organizations such as deputy 
chiefs and the Army Materiel Command and subordinate materiel commands from playing a 
direct role in the acquisition process. As will be seen in the next section, a similar pattern 
emerged in the Air Force. 
The Air Force 
Before the Storm 
The evolution of responsibilities for the acquisition of major systems and components 





As was true with the other military departments, the Secretary of the Air Force is 
responsible for all activities occurring within the department, including acquisition. 
Throughout the period under examination, the Secretary was supported by an assistant 
secretary who was designated as the Air Force Acquisition Executive (AFAE). In 1986, this 
was the Assistant Secretary for Research, Development, and Logistics (SAF/AL). Later, the 
role of the AFAE was assigned to the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition 
(SAF/AQ). The Assistant Secretary also chaired the Air Force Systems Acquisition Review 
Council (AFSARC), which was the principal board that advised the Secretary. (According to 
the 1986 instruction, the Secretary did not delegate his role as the milestone decision 
authority.)  Several members of the Air Force Chief of Staff’s general staff were also 
assigned as members of the AFSARC. These members were the Vice Chief of Staff, Deputy 
Chief of Staff (DCS) Logistics & Engineering, DCS Research Development, and Acquisition 
(RD&A). It is interesting to note that HQ USAF issued Program Management Directives 
(PMDs) that define the scope of the program being procured, and provide program direction 
and guidance. However, the implementing command appears to have had great leeway. 
The executing authority for acquisition programs resided with the “implementing 
command,” which was designated on a program-by-program basis by the AF Headquarters 
acquisition staff. One of the implementing commands named directly within the 1986 
regulation was the Air Force Systems Command (AFSC). In its role as an implementing 
command, it was responsible for accomplishing program executive supervision in much the 
same way that PEOs do currently, albeit over a much larger set of programs. AF REG 800-
2, dated September 16, 1985, stated that the “designated Line Authority for major decisions 
during the acquisition of weapon systems typically include the Secretary of Defense, 
Secretary of the Air Force, and the Commander, Air Force Systems Command.”  However, it 
also stated that, under “Responsibilities of the HQ USAF”, that HQ issued Program 
Management Directives that established programs, provided program guidance and 
direction, designated implementing commands and issued the Justification of a Major 
System New Start (JMSNS) to begin the acquisition process. 
 
Figure 7. Air Force Acquisition before Goldwater-Nichols  
After the Storm 
Following the Goldwater-Nichols era reforms, the Air Force reissued its acquisition 





first to mention of the AFAE as directly managing acquisition programs and personnel. 
These post Goldwater-Nichols instructions make no mention of acquisition responsibilities 
within the AFHQ general staff until the 2009 reissues, when the Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Operations, Plans, and Requirements (HQ AF/A3/5) is tasked with “collaboratively work[ing] 
with the acquirer, tester, sustainer, and other key stakeholders in developing operational 
capabilities requirements documents.” 
With regard to the materiel commands, after 1994, the instructions task the Air Force 
Materiel Command (AFMC), (AFMC was the successor command, which absorbed in 1994 
both the Air Force Systems Command and the Air Force Logistics Command, eliminating 
one four-star position) with formally and informally advising and assisting the AFAE, PEOs, 
and PMs. Figure 7 depicts these changes. 
 
Figure 8. Air Force Acquisition in 1994DCS Plans & Operations, DCS 
Programs & Resources 
A Comparison of the Before and After by Department 
As stated earlier, the Navy’s culture differed significantly from that of her sister 
services and was reflected in the organization of the DoN and its management structure. 
The CNO viewed the landscape in operational terms befitting his title of Chief of Naval 
Operations. That is, the original creation of the bi-linear Navy did not engage the CNO 
immediately in the administration of the various material “bureaus” that handled the 
acquisition and logistical functions supporting the Navy. The Bureaus of Ships, Ordnance, 
Aeronautics and Supply and Accounts were some of the bureaus that handled such 
functions and reported to the Secretary of the Navy. In 1966, with the creation of the Chief of 
Naval Material, subsequent CNOs played a greater role in the management of and 
production by the material establishment. Even so, for individual CNOs who had grown up in 
the operational world and particularly those without significant Washington, DC, experience, 
dealing with material (including acquisition) matters was somewhat foreign. Furthermore, 
because the DoN included two services, the Navy and the Marine Corps, the DoN 
Secretariat tended to act in greater scope from those of the Army and Air Force.  
The term “Chief of Staff” meant chief of staff to the Secretary of the Army and 
Secretary of the Air Force. As no such office existed in the DoN, and its Secretariat was 
responsible for a broader set of functions, which in the other Military Departments were 
performed in the service headquarters staffs. A couple of examples in central departmental 
management functions (finance and contracts) are illustrative. First, the Department of the 





Management (ASN (FM)), not to either service chief. In its functions, that budget office 
excited ecumenical control the finances of the two DoN sister services and clearly worked 
for the Secretary. While in the planning and programming processes, the two services built 
their POM for the Secretary to approve, the subsequent budget fell under the management 
of the Secretary through the ASN (FM). In a second example, contract award approvals 
were managed by another DoN Assistant Secretary, depending on the item being procured. 
The contract award justification, called the Determination and Findings (D&F), had to be 
reviewed and approved by the appropriate office in the Navy Secretariat before contracts 
were awarded, which meant they played a major role in acquisition.13  A last point is that the 
DoN Secretariat was staffed to perform these regulatory and statutory functions and, as a 
result, was larger than those found in the other military departments. For example, the ASN 
(FM) staff, including the Comptroller, at times exceeded several hundred people. 
A second major difference between the Navy and her sister services was the manner 
in which the staffs were structured for decision-making. The other services tended to look 
upon issues through functional ions. That is, when those services addressed issues, their 
reviews occurred at the functional level of manpower, logistics, modernization, etc. In the 
Navy, responsibility was held by three-star admirals who controlled surface, submarine and 
aviation portfolios. These three-star admirals also had a major voice in the requirements 
determination and acquisition processes before Goldwater-Nichols and had direct 
relationships with their three-star counterparts in the Navy’s systems commands. Issues that 
arose between statement of requirements and the ability to develop acquisition programs 
could be resolved at this three-star level. Concurrent with the Goldwater-Nichols Act (but for 
reasons different from the passage of the act) and its movement of the acquisition function 
more fully into the DoN Secretariat, the Navy abolished those three-star billets and reduced 
the functions they performed to the two star level, impeding discussions with the systems 
commanders (who concurrently were removed from the acquisition chain because the new 
PEOs reported directly to the ASN (RD&A)). The Army and Air Force did not have those 
concurrent changes in their structures although the removal of the PEOs from the Systems 
Commanders also occurred in those Departments. It is interesting to note that both the Army 
and Air Force later requested and received waivers to allow the PEOs to report to what was 
in essence the equivalent to the Navy’ Systems Commanders. 
Another major distinction was that while the Army and Air Force had Systems 
Acquisition Review Councils (both before and after Goldwater-Nichols) the Navy did not. 
Programs wound their way through a set of systems command reviews, two-star review in 
the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations and then through the CNO-chaired CEB meeting 
and, finally, on to the Secretary of the Navy for decision. 
The ASARC and AFSARC boards were co-chaired by the service vice chiefs, both 
before and after Goldwater-Nichols. Thus, the service chief had an important representative 
in councils dealing with acquisition decisions. Furthermore, based upon our interviews with 
Air Force and Army retired three-stars, the principal deputy position was generally filled by a 
senior uniformed executive (typically a three-star General) in each of the secretariat 
acquisition offices and played major roles in both the selection of acquisition personnel 
(including the management of the acquisition workforce) as well as the distinct function of 
                                                
13 The D&Fs are written, signed, legally binding statements, submitted by an employee, to 
explain/justify the method and logic that he/she used to select material, services, or suppliers when 





briefing the Service Chief on all matters of acquisition interest prior to his attendance in any 
structured meeting with the Department’s Secretary on such matters. 
With the passage and eventual implementation of Goldwater-Nichols, the Navy 
acquisition programs no longer went through the following: systems commanders, two-star 
CNO staff board, and CNO Executive Board. 
In its place, a Navy Program Decision Meeting (known at the NPDM) was created 
and chaired by the ASN (RD&A). While CNO staff flags were invited to the meetings, they 
were held at the behest and schedule of the ASN (RD&A), and our interviews indicated that 
they were poorly attend by Navy flag officers. This led to the perception of isolation of the 
service chief and his staff from those functions. 
Thus, as shown above, the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the subsequent changes in 
the CNOs staff had greater ramifications for the Navy than it did for the other services. 
How Navy Implementation Affected Acquisition 
This chapter describes what we see as four major consequences that resulted from 
the manner in which the Department of the Navy implemented the Goldwater-Nichols Act. 
The first is the exclusive civilian control of the acquisition process with military 
disenfranchisement. The second is the loss of blended workforce. The third is the separation 
of the “line” (naval officers who have operational assignments that lead to their promotion 
and success in the Navy). The fourth is the continuing search for rebalance and the 
unintended consequences of the manner in which the current DoN leadership has chosen to 
attempt to re-integrate the operation naval officers (line) into the acquisition process. 
Increasing Civilian Control over the Acquisition Process: Constructing an 
Impenetrable Wall 
Senator Nunn stated during the conference leading up to enactment of Goldwater-
Nichols that he had been “concerned that we not create an impenetrable wall between the 
staffs of the Service Secretary and the Service Chief” (Nunn, 1985, S12651). In our 
interviews with senior Navy and OSD officials directly involved in implementing the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act,14 most had been concerned about this possibility or they became 
concerned after its passage. In fact, of the twenty-five former and current civilian and 
uniformed officials (including those in the Air Force and Army) interviewed, all but two had 
no doubt that a wall had, in fact, been created between operational officers and acquisition 
officials.  
In terms of our senior-level interviewees, only one—a former USD AT&L—believed 
that a minimal amount of separation between military and civilian leadership resulted from 
implementation of Goldwater-Nichols. Moreover, he believed this separation had been 
constructive, contributing to creative tension and leading to a more efficient use of 
resources. In short, he believed the service chiefs could still influence acquisition decisions. 
However, the remaining interviewees were much less sanguine about the outcome. 
Similarly, an Air Force civilian executive with a rich background in acquisition matters did not 
                                                
14 In this instance, interviewees included a former CNO, a former Secretary of the Navy, a former 
Navy General Counsel, a former Asst. Secretary of the Navy (Research Development and 





believe that the military leadership was disadvantaged by the separation of the military 
requirements community from their acquisition brethren. 
According to a former Principal Deputy ASN (RD&A), the acquisition community 
eliminated roles in the acquisition process traditionally filled from the Office of the Chief of 
Naval Operations (OPNAV) staff. A former CNO reported that he himself felt excluded from 
the acquisition process, as did all senior officers of all ranks and career fields who were 
interviewed. One former USD AT&L, who came to believe that the service chiefs and 
combatant commanders were now too far removed from the entire acquisition process, 
thought it essential that Service Chiefs become more involved in procurement planning, 
especially in helping to set realistic performance requirements and to make trade-off 
decisions during program development. Both Under Secretaries of Defense (AT&L) 
interviewed believed that establishing a four-star Vice Chief as co-chair of the Service 
Acquisition Board could overcome the growing divide between a military-based 
requirements process and a civilian-based acquisition process. In this scenario, the Vice 
Chief’s role would be similar to that of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in his role as 
co-chair of the Defense Acquisition Board.  
The DoN leadership is not blind to this problem. It has attempted to breakdown the 
barriers between the CNO’s staff and the Secretariat with regard to requirements and 
acquisition. The Navy Gate System is the latest effort to link the acquisition process and 
requirements process, initiated in a SECNAV Notice 5000 in February 2008. The system 
established a six-gate process (the circled numbers in the Navy/USMC level) in which each 
gate represents a formal decision point at which the costs and benefits of a particular 
weapon system program are evaluated (see Figure 9). 
 
 
Figure 9. Navy Gate System 





As seen on the chart, a vertical dotted line separates the first three decision gates 
from the last three. The first three gates are supposed to be managed on the requirements 
side15 and the following three gates are managed on the acquisition side.16  That the dotted 
line reinforces the notion of separation in Senator Nunn’s “impenetrable wall.” 
Blended Workforce and the Engagement of Operational Officers in the 
Business of Acquisition 
A principal motive of the Goldwater-Nichols Act was to improve our military’s ability 
to fight in a more joint manner; consequently, not only weapon systems, but also officer 
experience and training must now include joint duty and considerations. All of the senior-
level officials we interviewed reported that they had, at the time Goldwater-Nichols was 
implemented, believed there was a need for better communication among the military 
departments and more joint collaboration in operations. However, an unintended 
consequence of requiring officers to serve in a joint duty assignment to achieve flag or 
general officers rank was the migration of line officers away from the acquisition process 
because of the pressure of satisfying additional demands during a career whose length did 
not expand to accommodate the additional demands. 
This migration became a particular concern in the Department of the Navy as it had 
maintained over time a blended workforce in its acquisition processes. Before Goldwater-
Nichols, there existed a blend of naval and marine officers along with technically-oriented 
civilians worked across the material establishment. Program offices, systems commands, 
laboratories and field activities were generally managed by military officers who rotated into 
the material establishment from operational billets and brought with them a wealth of real-
world fleet experience. Coupled with them were a group of highly skilled engineers and 
scientists who, working together developed and procured the nation’s naval weapons 
systems. 
Upon the implementation of Goldwater-Nichols, the creation of an acquisition 
workforce resulted in a formulaic career path for those whose intent was to work in 
acquisition. While it created certain incentives for the civilian element of the workforce, it 
also created significant differences between civilian and uniformed workforces. First, the 
civilians involved in acquisition and the uniformed personnel involved in acquisition had 
completely different chains of command and, consequently, a different performance 
evaluation and promotion structure. The new workforce structure also demanded new 
educational mechanisms, to prepare individuals for careers in the acquisition workforce. The 
Defense Acquisition University (DAU) was established with a heavy civilianized structure 
and outlook. The agility of acquisition was slowed by this new institutional training and the 
demand for military personnel to participate in the DAU courses heavily affected military 
career assignment and rotation.  
Exacerbating the “civilianization” of the workforce was an unintended consequence 
of Goldwater-Nichols emphasis on joint warfighting to satisfy promotion requirements. 
Before Goldwater-Nichols, officers had more time to rotate through positions related to both 
                                                
15 Specifically, they are managed by the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, for Integration of 
Capabilities and Resources (DCNO (N8))/DC and DC&I, CNO/Commandant, Marine Corps (CMC) in 
OPNAV/ Headquarters, US Marine Corps (HQMC).  





the operational realm and the material management process, giving those officers a deeper 
understanding of the civilian side of the acquisition process. With the rigid requirement of 
joint duty service, however, officers no longer had time to rotate between operational duty 
assignments and material management assignments if they wanted to achieve flag or 
general officer rank in an operational role. Furthermore, those who now chose to devote 
their energies to acquisition saw their operational experience decline in comparison to the 
counterparts who served only in line assignments, which meant they lost some of their 
credibility when it came to weighing in on the value of a particular performance requirement, 
for example. As the number of officers serving in acquisition roles decreased, a sense 
emerged of the acquisition process “belonging” to the largely civilian material establishment, 
not the operations line community. Our interviews with senior Army and Air Force officers 
echoed these observations about their own services. Almost to a person, our interviewees 
remarked on the need to create an incentive for senior line officers to serve in acquisition 
roles. That is not to say that there is not a role for engineering restricted duty officers in the 
acquisition workforce. However, a blended workforce should contain officers with warfighting 
training and perspective to ensure a rich mix of talent is available to the acquisition 
leadership. 
Unintended Consequences 
In this chapter, the Navy Gate System is described. In that example, a large 
structured set of meetings and briefings needed to be established because the DoN’s 
acquisition instructions explicitly left the uniformed Navy out of the processes.  That said, it 
still stands. It should be noted that given Senator Nunn’s explicit concern over such an 
outcome, this is also no unintended consequence. 
In SECNAV INST. 5400, the applicable reference to the CNO and CMC is that the 
ASN (RD&A) “shall provide such staff support each consider necessary to perform his duties 
and responsibilities.”  There is no mention of any other responsibility for the service chiefs. 
When the act was passed, our interviewees indicated that the uniform Navy offered a three-
star deputy to the ASN (RD&A), but that was refused and a senior executive was installed in 
that position. Throughout the ensuing twenty years, a mix of SESs and officers from one-to-
three star rank have filled that position. But the DoN acquisition decision boards never had 
the uniformed Navy in any leadership position. In both the Army and Air Force, as evidenced 
from our interviews, the Vice Chiefs of each service at one time either chaired their 
acquisition decision boards, or, in more recent times, co-chaired those boards. The reason 
this is important is that the co-chairmanship gives the senior leadership an opportunity to 
demand and get information from the acquisition chain of command, starting with the 
program manager and going up to the PEO. That information flow is important to the 
decision process because it provides an understanding of what is happening in the program. 
This insight also allowed the uniformed Navy to see the consequences of its “requirements” 
process and the effect of changes made in various portions of the PPBE process. With this 
knowledge comes a shared responsibility for the end product, a most desired effect. Another 
consequence to knowledge is the loss of operational officers who understood the acquisition 
process. The result is that many of the flag officers who work in the office of the CNO have 
little to no experience with or understanding of the issues facing acquisition programs. 
Therefore, the requirements process sometimes imposes unreasonable demands and the 
PPBE process removes funding at critical times. In some of our interviews, some PEOs 





Conclusions, Recommendations, and Issues that Warrant 
Further Study 
Changes that affect the culture and processes of large bureaucratic organizations 
are always difficult to achieve. The notion of the need for and acceptance of the reality of a 
“burning platform” as enunciated by Gerstner at IBM is exactly for that reason. Military 
establishments because of their organization and the existential nature of their purpose are 
the most difficult to change, certainly to change quickly. In the case of the defense 
establishment in the ‘80s and ‘90s, it was change imposed by legislation that focused on 
“fixing” a myriad of both absurd and preserved problems without a clear understanding of 
the consequences that these fixes would being about. Legislated change in large 
enterprises has that effect, and it is noteworthy that the senior congressional protagonists 
were wary of unintended consequences but were driven to make changes because of the 
problems they had observed for well over a decade. In retrospect, it would appear that many 
of the interrelationships were not well understood. At each turn over the ensuing quarter 
century, many changes have been made in both statute and regulation to deal with “just one 
score” problem overlooked by previous attempts. It would be interesting to engage in time 
travel to see what the protagonists in the mid-‘80s would have done if they were given a 
glimpse of the results. But that is not a particularly useful exercise because the problems 
were real and no one is contemplating reversing what has been done. Rather we must sift 
through the results of actions taken over time and see what may be practically done to 
address the concerns that were laid out by a previous CNO and form the core of our inquiry. 
Just as the various statutes that were passed reflected the perception of members of 
Congress of the nature of the problems being experienced by the DoD, both operational, 
and in stewarding the public monies and trust, so perceptions of intent governed the 
promulgation of regulations to effect that legislation. The testimony we received strongly 
suggests that the intent was not clearly understood and there was a significant amount of 
interpretation, some of it self-serving, in promulgation of Instructions, Directives and 
Regulations. What appears to be a clear pattern is that many folks had reservations, not 
unlike Senator Nunn, but pressed forward anyway because the mandate for change at least 
was clear. What also became apparent is that the DoN, as a result of earlier resistance, was 
directed to proceed by higher authority an even more literal interpretation then necessary 
and did so. This “letter of the law” approach, taken even though there were reservations 
among the leadership, had the result of an implementation in the DoN different than those in 
the other military departments.  
Clearly, Senator Nunn did not intend a rigid divide between civilian and military 
leaderships. Equally clearly, the Departments of the Army and Air Force have managed to 
avoid it to a certain degree under the same statutory and directive constraints that face the 
DoN.  That leads us to conclude that the approach taken by the DoN is more malleable than 
believed.  The authors would also conclude that the de facto exclusion of offices with an 
operational focus from the acquisition/material management process is not healthy.  Finally, 
it is concluded that to achieve the results of the process improvements discussed in the 
recently issued Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report, it is necessary that our best 
minds working together to solve problems, not sequentially engaging issues through 
choreographed organizational engagements. 
Accordingly, a small number of specific recommendations are made  and suggest 






1. Make changes to applicable DoN Directives to undo the isolation conveyed 
by the Navy Gates Process and articulate a coherent and continuing role for 
the Service Chiefs across the range of the acquisition process, more like 
those of the other military departments. 
2. Make changes to applicable DoN Directives to create and acquisition 
oversight body co-chaired by the ASN (RD&A) and the VCNO (and the 
ACMC for the discussion of Marine Corps systems of priority interest). 
3. Create career opportunities for officers of the line in the material 
establishment. 
Areas of Further Study 
4. Best principles and approaches to expand and rebalance the acquisition 
workforce to enable informed collaboration in the requirements and resources 
processes. 
1. The granting of “joint-duty” credit for officers in large acquisition 
programs as suggested by the QDR for “recognizing joint experience 
whenever and wherever it occurs.” 
2. Appropriate changes to DOPMA to create enhanced Senior Officer 
opportunities in acquisition. 
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